Like those in many other western states,
Utah's leaders has long recognized that an important
key to prosperity is federal spending in their state.
Even so, until the Great Depression of the 1930s Utahns
had been largely unsuccessful in securing very much
federal investment in the state. However, as a result
of a peculiar set of circumstances in the 1930s involving
personalities, party politics, a favorable business
environment, economic depression, and geographic serendipity
Utah emerged from the 1940s a much different place than
it had been at the beginning of the decade. Utah's role
in the World War II was at the heart of these changes.
This activity led to a variety of other changes that
fundamentally affected the cultural and political life
of the state. Population shifts, societal alterations,
transforming cultural patterns, and a host of other
subtle moves recast Utah from an isolated and culturally
backward state into an area much more tied to the national
mainstream.
Without question, the rapid growth of defense spending
in Utah, coming even before the first shots were fired
at Pearl Harbor, fueled the major transformations of
the society. Utah had been economically devastated during
the 1930s; in the late 1930s Utah still had from 30
to 60 percent more people on federal relief projects--WPA,
CCC, or some other program--than the national average.
While the national average for people unemployed in
the 1930s peaked at 25 percent, in Utah the number of
workers without jobs reached a high of 36 percent. Utah
government and business leaders tried a variety of avenues
to ease this situation, and in the latter 1930s as the
nation began to rearm in response to the crisis in Europe
they exploited the opportunity offered to secure defense
dollars in the state.
Some of this came directly from military installations
that were established in the state. Fort Douglas, long
established near Salt Lake City as a result of Col.
Connor's California Volunteers in the Civil War, was
revitalized and made into a processing center for recruits.
The Ogden Arsenal had been established in 1921 but had
a relatively small mission to store ammunition until
the crisis of World War II when it became a manufacturing,
storage, and shipping location for the West Coast.
Hill Field, as another example, was established in 1940
as a result of a combination of influences that began
in 1934 when the Army Air Corps flew the mail and based
its western zone out of Salt Lake City. The zone's commander,
Henry H. Arnold, became enthusiastic about the area's
ability to support West Coast aeronautical logistics
requirements. Arnold told his superiors in September
1934 "that any Depot west of the mountains might
be rendered untenable by a determined adversary."
During the late 1930s two additional strategic reasons
emerged for creating a supply and repair base near Salt
Lake City: the historic confluence of highways and railroads
in the area ensured that the base would be easily accessible,
and the site was essentially equidistant from the three
major military centers on the West Coast, Seattle-Portland,
San Francisco, and Los Angeles-San Diego. Accordingly,
on 7 November 1940, Hill became operational and served
throughout the war as a major repair and supply depot
for the Army Air Forces. At its largest, Hill Field
employed 15,000 civilians, 6,000 military, and several
thousand POWs, making it the largest employer in the
state.
In all, Utah had fourteen important military installations
operating during the war. These installations created
nearly 40,000 jobs in the state during World War II,
more than half of them at Hill Field, and the multiplying
effect of federal paychecks spent in the local economy
provided a great boost to the state.
In every case, the military services explicitly recognized
several unique attributes Utah offered. First, there
was the issue of safety from attack, a not unrealistic
concern by the military in 1941 and 1942. The ability
of the Japanese Navy to strike 6,000 miles east of their
traditional sphere of operations and to cripple the
American fleet in Hawaii was not an action to be dismissed
without serious consideration. If Japan could do it
there, what was to keep the Japanese from hitting core
military installations on the West Coast? In the early
days of the war, no one knew that the Japanese did not
have that capability, and on 9 December 1941 Henry H.
Arnold, commanding the United States Army's Air Forces,
directed that military resources be dispersed inland
so that a single attack could not destroy significant
military capability. In such an environment, decisions
to locate training and other support facilities to inland
areas was a natural extension. The greater security
for bases in the Great Basin interior ensured that military
efforts would not be impeded by possible enemy attack.
Second, the open spaces available in Utah and throughout
the West also made training operations there all the
more attractive. The selection of the Wendover, Utah,
training site is a case in point. Located on the Utah-Nevada
border approximately 110 miles west of Salt Lake City,
it had vast amounts of open flat land that the Department
of the Interior already controlled. The town had only
a small population of approximately 103 people at the
time and yet possessed adequate railroad lines running
between Salt Lake City and the West Coast. The weather
conditions in the area were also ideally suited for
flying training, as there was very little rain or snow
and flight training could take place year-round. Adding
to the attractiveness of the desert area were Army Air
Corps plans to base a heavy bomber unit at the Salt
Lake City municipal airport and the location of the
supply and repair depot at Hill Field, near Ogden. It
was envisioned that the units at these bases would be
prime users of the proposed range. In June 1940 a large
area near Wendover was designated as a general purpose
range for aerial gunnery and actual bombing practice.
Third, the Wasatch Front area was excellent for logistics
support operations. It was basically equidistant from
the three major West Coast military centers at Seattle,
San Francisco, and Los Angeles. There was also a superb
transportation infrastructure in place to support logistics
activities. Transcontinental railroads and highways
were in place, and Salt Lake City had been an integral
part of the transcontinental airway system since the
early 1920s. The shipping and receiving of war material,
therefore, posed little difficulty.
Finally, the state of Utah had a large number of intelligent,
deferential people who were out of work and willing
to be retrained for military logistics purposed. That,
coupled with the aggressive actions of the state's business
and political leaders prompted the sitting of installations
in Utah. The military expansion built upon Utah's recognized
strengths and did not represent a great departure in
direction, only an acceleration of what had been underway
for some time.
In addition to the actual military installations established
or revitalized in the state, defense contractors also
enjoyed remarkable growth as a result of the war. By
any measure an economist can devise, the economy of
Utah boomed as a result of war contracts. The value
added by the manufacturer between 1939 and 1947--a measure
of profits after all costs have been subtracted-- was
$85 million, which represented a 196 percent increase.
The state's business and political leaders were aggressive
in obtaining federal spending for the state, and 91
percent of Utah's wartime expansion was financed by
public funds. This allowed Utah's per capita expenditure
for new industrial plants from the federal government
to be $534 while the national average was $188.
Industrial expansion in Utah took a course that emphasized
historic strengths. The state, rich in natural resources
and with a long tradition of extractive industry, contributed
coal, iron, dolomite, limestone, alunite, copper, gas,
and the refined products to the war effort. The most
significant of these was the Geneva Steel Works in Orem.
It accounted for nearly two-thirds of the $310 million
made available to Utah for new facility construction
by the Defense Plant Corporation in 1941, and when operating
at maximum capacity employed 4,200 workers. During its
period of government operation, it took iron from Utah's
mines, as well as from elsewhere, and produced 634,010
tons of plate steel and another 144,280 tons of shaped
steel.
Throughout the state, mines for all types of minerals
were reopened, expanded, or constructed. The capabilities
of processing plants were also greatly enlarged. This
practice was also repeated in the state's weapons industry.
The Browning Gun Works, manufacturers of fine small
arms since the mid-nineteenth century, was expanded
in the war. Also at the same time, the Ogden Arsenal
began making ammunition. The Remington Arms Company
constructed a small arms plant in Salt Lake County to
make 30- and 50-caliber ammunition, and in the process
created 10,000 new jobs.
The economic roller-coaster ride of Utah business was
perhaps the most dramatic aspect of the state's wartime
role, but it may have not been the most significant.
The social and political changes that were forced on
the state as a result of the wartime expansion had a
fundamental impact. Thousands of Utahns found themselves
in military service literally around the world. In 1941,
out of more than 1.3 million service members in the
United States only 7,000 were from Utah, 2,000 of which
were in the state's National Guard units. In June 1945
there were 62,107 Utahns in active military service,
and this did not include those already discharged for
one reason or another and those killed. The movement
of large numbers of people from the state to other places,
disrupting lives and comfortable patterns of behavior,
had a significant impact on those who went through the
trauma of war. Upon return, they were never the same
again and old perspectives had to be altered to take
into account the new realities.
Equally important, the state experienced a rapid and
sustained influx of immigrants from outside, most of
whom did not subscribe to the dominant religious position
and eschewed its conservatism. For instance, Utah's
population increased 25.2 percent during the decade
-- most of the increase coming along the Wasatch Front
-- as it grew from 555,310 to 688,862 persons. This
immigration greatly increased the minority population
of the state, especially as Black and Hispanic Americans
moved in to take defense jobs. Another 10,000 Japanese-Americans
were relocated from the West Coast to Topaz, Utah, as
part of the anti-Japanese hysteria in late 1941 and
1942, and many remained in the state thereafter. This
population growth and expansion brought a far greater
degree of pluralism than ever before had been present
in Utah.
The population shifts also changed the region in other
subtle and vital ways. Servicemen and transient war
workers, for instance, were everywhere: they were passing
through the region enroute to debarkation points overseas
or home on furlough, or were temporarily stationed in
the state. These people pumped dollars into every community
through which they passed. They also brought Iowa farmboy,
New York streetwise, and southern homespun manners to
a region that had been uniquely isolated by distance
and mores from most of the rest of the nation. Many
of those stationed in the region formed attachments
to it that affected the rest of their lives. These population
shifts also created housing and other urban problems
that had to be dealt with throughout the 1940s.
The social dislocation arising from the war was also
great. The disruption of the traditional family, the
sense of impermanence, the absence of normal attachments,
the competition for scarce resources, the stress of
the crisis, and numerous other factors of a less tangible
nature all came together to turn society topsy turvy.
Historian John Costello documented one aspect of the
changing sexual mores of the United States brought about
by the war by suggesting that not only did women enter
the work force in a big way, but many of the other traditional
sexual boundaries were eroded by the war. He commented
that total war unleashed a "Hedonistic impulse"
in the overall society. The thought of perhaps dying
tomorrow created a psyche directed toward living life
to the fullest at the present both among those who might
go into combat and those with whom they associated.
It loosened morals and opened doors for opportunity
as never before.
It apparently made little difference that Salt Lake
City and Tooele, Utah, were far from the direct influences
of combat. The comings and goings of military personnel
in the region, most likely to combat theaters, held
the same potential for eventual death as those closer
to the action. There were large numbers of war brides
in Utah, and they lived with the same fears as those
closer to the front lines. The "flyboys" and
"G.I.s" training or even permanently stationed
at the many bases in the region met, fell in love, and
in some cases married local young women. They were often
condemned for a "love-them-and-leave-them"
attitude, however, and virtually every community had
problems of one sort or another relating to this social
interaction. City fathers were forever trying to protect
the local women from the perceived licentiousness of
the servicemen.
Some even condoned prostitution as a means of easing
pressures in the local community. The notorious "two-bit
street," Ogden, Utah's 25th Street red light district
had been around for many years prior to the war, but
it was expanded during the war as the so-called "Victory
Girls" catered to the wishes of the local servicemen.
As long as the activity was out of sight from most of
the public the city fathers turned a blind eye to the
goings-on, in part because it eased some of the pressure
on their daughters.
Other affects of the war to Utahns involved the challenges
of living in a new environment. Never again would life
in the state be as simple as it had seemed before the
war. To a very real extent the war effort served as
the catalyst to bring Utah's economy, political culture,
and social life into the national mainstream.
Roger D. Launius